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The Impact of Capital Requirements
on U.K. Bank Behaviour
Tolga Ediz, Ian Michael, and William Perraudin
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR 
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON BANK BEHAVIOUR
The 1988 Basle Accord obliges banks to maintain equity
and quasi-equity funding equal to a risk-weighted propor-
tion of their asset base. Regulators’ intentions in adopting
the Accord were, first, to reinforce financial stability, second,
to establish a level playing field for banks from different
countries, and third, in the case of some countries, to
reduce explicit or implicit costs of government-provided
deposit guarantees. But extensive reliance by banking
supervisors on capital requirements inevitably begs ques-
tions about the possibly distortionary impact on bank
behaviour.
The most obvious possible, and undesirable,
impact on bank behaviour of risk-weighted capital require-
ments is that excessive differentials in the weights applied
to different categories of assets might induce banks to sub-
stitute away from highly risk-weighted assets. In the early
1990s, U.S. banks shifted sharply from corporate lending
to investing in government securities, and many commen-
tators and researchers have attributed this shift to the post–
Basle Accord system of capital requirements.
While papers such as Hall (1993), Haubrich and
Wachtel (1993), Calem and Rob (1996), and Thakor
(1996) make a persuasive case that capital requirements
played a role in this switch, the conclusion is not entirely
uncontroversial. Hancock and Wilcox (1993), for example,
present evidence that U.S. banks’ own internal capital tar-
gets explain the decline in private sector lending better
than do the capital requirements imposed by regulators.
Furthermore, the fact that capital requirements affect bank
behaviour does not of course imply that the impact is
undesirable. Bank supervisors must judge whether the
induced levels of capital are adequate, or not, given the
broad goals of regulation.
A second potential, undesirable impact on banks
of risk-weighted, capital requirements of the Basle Accord–
type is that banks may shift within each asset category
toward riskier assets. Imposing equal risk weights on
different private sector loans may make the safer, lower
yielding assets less attractive, leading to substitution
toward higher risk investments. Kim and Santomero (1988)
show formally how a bank that maximises mean-variance
preferences and faces uniform proportional capital require-
ments may substitute toward higher risk assets.
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Theoretical contributions by Keeley and Furlong
(1989, 1990) and Rochet (1992) show that such substitu-
tion effects are sensitive to assumptions about banks’ objec-
tive functions and to whether or not asset markets are
complete. The extent to which banks are affected by this
kind of distortion therefore remains an empirical question.
Several recent econometric studies have looked for substi-
tution effects attributable to capital requirements using
data on U.S. banks. See, for example, Shrieves and Dahl
(1992), Haubrich and Wachtel (1993), and Jacques and
Nigro (1997).
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
All the empirical papers cited above draw on the U.S. expe-
rience. U.S. data have many advantages, most notably the
very large number of banks for which data are available and
the detailed information one may obtain on individual
institutions. Nevertheless, it is important to examine the
impact of capital requirement systems operating in other
countries. Although the Basle approach provides a basic
framework of minimum capital standards, regulators in
different countries have supplemented it with a range of
other requirements that deserve empirical investigation.
Furthermore, data from other (that is, non-U.S.) banking
markets may shed interesting light on the effects of capital
requirements simply because they constitute a largely
independent sample. The impact of capital requirements
can only really be studied by looking at cross-sectional
information on banks. Since U.S. banks are inevitably sub-
ject to large common shocks, banking industries in other
countries provide a valuable additional source of evidence.
In our paper titled “Bank Capital Requirements
and Regulatory Policy” (1998), we employ confidential
supervisory data for British banks to address some of the
issues outlined above. The panel data set we use comprises
quarterly balance sheet and income data from ninety-four
banks stretching from fourth-quarter 1989 to fourth-
quarter 1995. The two questions we are primarily inter-
ested in are (a) does pressure from supervisors affect bank
capital dynamics when capital ratios approach their reg-
ulatory minimum, and (b) by adjusting which items in
their balance sheets do banks increase their capital ratios
when subject to regulatory pressure?
BANK CAPITAL REGULATION
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
To understand the interest and implications of our study, it
is important to have a clear idea of the operation of bank
capital regulation in the United Kingdom. While the U.K.
approach is fully consistent with the basic standards laid
down in the Basle Accord, various additional requirements
are placed on banks by U.K. supervisors. First, U.K. super-
visors set two capital requirements—a “trigger ratio,”
which is the minimum capital ratio with which a bank
must comply, and a “target” ratio set somewhat above the
trigger ratio. The gap between the target and the trigger
acts as a buffer in that regulatory pressure is initiated when
a bank’s risk asset ratio (RAR) falls below the target. If the
RAR falls below the trigger ratio, supervisors take more
drastic action, and ultimately may revoke a bank’s license.
Another important feature of U.K. practice is that
supervisors specify bank-specific capital requirements.
Banks adjudged to be risky by the supervisors must meet
higher capital requirements than less risky institutions.
Risky in this context may reflect supervisors’ evaluation of
the bank’s loan book or possibly their perception that there
exist weaknesses in systems of control or in the competence
of management. For most U.K. banks, capital require-
ments exceed the Basle minimum of 8 percent. The ability
to vary a bank’s capital requirement administratively pro-
vides regulators with a very useful lever with which they
can influence the actions of the bank’s management.
The empirical implications of the system
described above are (a) that one might expect that banks
experiencing or fearing regulatory pressure will seek to
boost their capital ratios when their RARs enter a region
above the regulatory minimum, and (b) that changes in a
bank’s trigger ratio will induce a change in the bank’s capi-
tal dynamics. We investigate these hypotheses below.
DATA DESCRIPTION
Before looking at bank capital dynamics statistically, it
is useful to examine our data to understand its basicFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 17
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structure. In Chart 1, we provide a scatter diagram of
changes over a quarter in banks’ RARs (pooled across
banks and time periods) plotted against the lagged level of
the RAR. Rather than expressing the lagged RAR in its
natural units, we prefer to measure it in terms of deviations
from the trigger ratio divided by the sample standard devi-
ation of the RAR for each individual bank. This approach
makes sense because banks are likely to change their behav-
iour, boosting their RARs, when they are in danger of hit-
ting their regulatory minimum. The volatility of the RAR
(which varies substantially across different banks) is just as
important, therefore, as the actual distance in percent from
the current RAR to the trigger.
To facilitate interpretation of Chart 1, we include
a simple OLS linear regression line of RAR changes on
lagged RAR levels. As one might expect, this line is down-
ward sloping, reflecting the fact that low initial RAR lev-
els induce banks to rebuild their capital ratios. Perhaps the
most interesting feature of the chart, however, is the fact
that a clear nonlinearity is apparent in that deviations from
the regression line for low levels of the RAR are consis-
tently positive. This bears out our hypothesis that there
exists a regime switch in bank capital dynamics in the
region immediately above the trigger level.
The second question that interested us is exactly
how banks go about increasing their capital ratios when
they are low. Either banks might cut back private sector
loans that bear high risk weighting in favour of govern-
ment securities, for example, which attract low risk
weights. Alternatively, banks might boost their capital
directly by issuing new equity or by cutting dividends. As
we noted in the introduction, the substitution by banks
toward low-risk-weighted assets, which one might term
the credit crunch hypothesis, has been thoroughly dis-
cussed in the case of U.S. banks in the early 1990s by a
series of papers.
Chart 2 shows the change in 100-percent-
weighted assets as a ratio to total risk-weighted assets
(TRWA) plotted against the lagged level of the RAR. Once
again, the RAR level is expressed as a deviation from the
bank-specific trigger and is scaled by the standard devia-
tion of the RAR appropriate for each bank. The chart indi-
cates that there exists only a slight positive relationship
between changes in 100-percent-weighted assets and
lagged RARs. Furthermore, the nonlinearity clearly evi-
dent in Chart 1 appears not to be present. Thus, banks only
slightly reduce their holdings of 100-percent-weighted
assets when their RARs fall close to trigger levels, and the
credit crunch hypothesis appears not to be borne out.
Charts 3 and 4 repeat Chart 1 except for different
capital ratios. Respectively, they show changes in Tier 1
and Tier 2 capital as ratios to total risk-weighted assets
plotted against the lagged level of the RAR. Tier 1 repre-
sents narrow capital, mainly consisting of equity and18 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
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retained earnings. Recall that the Basle Accord specifies
that banks have to hold a ratio of Tier 1 capital to
risk-weighted assets of at least 4 percent. Tier 2 consists of
broad capital less narrow capital and primarily comprises
subordinated debt and other equity-like debt instruments.
Both the Tier 1 and the Tier 2 scatter plots exhibit strong
negative relationships between capital and the distance of
the RAR from the trigger ratio.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Although scatter plots provide valuable clues to the
bivariate relationship between capital changes and the
lagged level of capital, a formal regression analysis must be
performed if one wishes to understand the impact on capi-
tal changes of regulatory pressure, holding other influences
on capital constant. This is important because when a firm
falls into financial distress, it may seek to adjust its capital
in line with its own internally generated capital targets,
even without intervention by regulators (see the discussion
in Hancock and Wilcox [1993]). We, therefore, formu-
late a dynamic, multivariate panel regression model in
which changes in capital ratios depend on the lagged level
of the ratio, a range of conditioning variables describing
the nature of the bank’s business and its current financial
health (these proxy for the bank’s internal capital target),
and variables that may be regarded as measuring regulatory
pressure. Formally, our model may be stated as:
,
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period, and where    ,.....N are a set of
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the bank has experienced an upward adjustment in its trig-
ger ratio in the previous three quarters. Second, we include
a dummy that equals unity if the RAR falls close to the
regulatory minimum. As we argue above, the degree that a
bank is “close” to its trigger depends not just on the abso-
lute percentage difference between the current RAR and
the trigger but also on the volatility of the RAR. Hence,
we calculate the dummy in such a way that it is unity if the
RAR is less than one bank-specific standard deviation above
the bank’s trigger. Thus, our hypothesis is that there exists
a zone above the trigger in which the bank’s capital ratio
choices are constrained by regulatory pressure. In this respect,
our study is comparable to Jacques and Nigro (1997).
The dummy associated with a one-standard-
deviation zone above the trigger may be regarded as
introducing a simple regime switch in the model for low
levels of the RAR. To generalise this regime switch, we
also estimate switching regression models in which all the
parameters on the conditioning variables (not just the
intercept) are allowed to change when the RAR is less than
one standard deviation above the trigger. This specification
allows for the possibility that all the dynamics of the capi-
tal ratio change when the bank is close to its regulatory
minimum level of capital.
In formulating our panel model, we adopt a ran-
dom rather than a fixed-effects specification. We are not
so interested in obtaining estimates conditional on the
particular sample available that is the usual interpreta-
tion of the fixed-effect approach (see Hsiao [1986]) and so
the random-effects approach seems more appropriate.
Thus, we suppose that the variance of error terms has a
bank-specific component. Furthermore, we suppose that
the residuals are AR(1). The latter assumption seems nat-
ural as one might expect shocks to register in bank capital
ratios over more than a single quarter. The fact that error
terms are autocorrelated somewhat complicates estima-
tion since our model contains lagged endogenous vari-
ables. To avoid the biases in parameter estimates this
would otherwise induce, we employ the instrumental
variables approach introduced by Hatanaka (1974).
Table 1 reports regression results for the case in which
the dependent variable is the RAR. Note that estimates in
 
Table 1
RAR AND 100-PERCENT-WEIGHTED ASSETS REGRESSION RESULTS
RAR 100-Percent-Weighted Assets/TRWA
< trig + 1 s.d. > trig + 1 s.d. < trig + 1 s.d. > trig + 1 s.d.
Constant 0.05 0.08 -0.38 -0.01 -0.11 -0.48
   (1.38) (1.63) (-0.73) (-0.28) (-2.21) (-3.17)
Change in trigger dummy 0.27 1.46 — -0.16 -0.58 —
   (1.42) (1.94) — (-0.90) (-0.58) —
Fee income/net interest income 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01
 (0.40) (-0.17) (0.35) (0.06) (-0.15) (0.70)
Net interest income/TRWA 0.04 4.57 -0.66 1.30 -8.95 1.72
 (0.02) (0.41) (-0.23) (0.67) (-1.71) (0.83)
Deposits from banks/TRWA -0.19 0.54 -0.30 0.14 -0.12 0.32
   (-1.82) (1.88) (-2.47) (1.47) (-0.87) (2.49)
(RAR trigger) less than 1 s.d. 0.44 — — -0.03 — —
    (4.64) — — (-0.39) — —
Off-balance-sheet assets/TRWA  2.21 2.74 2.68 -1.01 -1.57 -0.43
   (1.65) (0.80) (1.64) (-0.90) (-0.62) (-0.29)
Profit and loss/TRWA -3.93 -8.35 -4.45 -1.42 -1.41 -3.58
    (-1.13) (-0.57) (-1.27) (-0.49) (-0.14) (-1.29)
Total provisions/TRWA 1.29 3.96 0.86 -0.59 -1.08 -0.18
    (1.26) (1.32) (0.70) (-0.54) (-0.27) (-0.16)
100-percent-weighted assets/TRWA 0.19 0.31 0.05 — — —
   (1.52) (1.05) (0.32) — — —
Lagged dependent variable -0.44 -2.62 0.77 -0.08 -1.64 -0.06
    (-0.81) (-0.92) (1.13) (-1.14) (-3.03) (-0.72)
Notes: TRWA and RAR denote total risk-weighted assets and risk/asset ratio. Data are for ninety-four banks from fourth-quarter 1989 to fourth-quarter 1995. Estimates 
are scaled by 100. All regressions employ the Hatanaka (1974) method. t-statistics appear in parentheses.20 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998
the table are scaled by 100. Our estimates strongly suggest
that capital requirements significantly affect banks’ capital
ratio decisions. The coefficient of the regime dummy is
positive and significant. The point estimate implies that
banks increase their RARs by around 1/2 percent per
quarter when their capital approaches the regulatory mini-
mum. In addition, we find that banks raise their RAR by
1/3 percent per quarter following an increase in their
trigger ratio by the supervisors.
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 1, we report estimates
for a switching regression model in which the coefficients
on all the conditioning variables are allowed to change
depending on whether the RAR is greater than or less than
one standard deviation above the trigger. One might note
that the impact of being near to or far from the trigger
appears to change little between the simpler model and
this generalised switching regression model. In the first
case, the parameter estimate on the dummy for proximity
to the trigger was 1/2 percent, while the difference between
the two intercepts in the switching regression model is also
around 1/2 percent. By contrast, the magnitude of the
dummy for recent increases in the trigger is far greater
when we relax the specification, rising from 1/3 percent in
the simpler model to 1 1/2 percent in the switching regres-
sion model.
One should also note that the coefficients on the
conditioning variables in the regressions all have plausible
signs. For example, higher profits reduce capital ratios
while higher provisions or 100-percent-weighted assets
increase them. It is also interesting that in the switch-
ing regressions model, banks with greater reliance on bank
deposits tend to increase their capital ratios. Overall, we
conclude that capital requirements induce banks to
increase their capital ratios even after one allows for inter-
nally generated capital targets. This conclusion is in
contrast to that of Hancock and Wilcox (1993) in their
study of U.S. banks.
The second question we are interested in is exactly
how banks achieve changes in their capital ratios if they are
subjected to regulatory pressure. The most obvious possibilities
are either that they adjust the asset side of their balance
sheets, for example, substituting government securities
Table 2
TIER 1 AND TIER 2 CAPITAL REGRESSION RESULTS
Tier 1 Capital/TRWA Tier 2 Capital/TRWA
< trig + 1 s.d. > trig + 1 s.d. < trig + 1 s.d. > trig + 1 s.d.
Constant 0.08 0.15 -0.88 -0.05 -0.08 0.11
    (1.95) (3.03) (-2.64) (-3.40) (-3.63) (0.83)
Change in trigger dummy -0.15 2.61 — 0.06 0.13 —
    (-0.69) (1.97) — (0.74) (0.27) —
Fee income/net interest income 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
    (0.32) (0.41) (0.22) (0.63) (0.31) (0.38)
Net interest income/TRWA 3.15 3.25 7.72 -0.20 0.08 -3.16
    (1.49) (0.37) (3.89) (-0.23) (0.02) (-3.54)
Deposits from banks/TRWA -0.15 0.40 -0.19 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03
    (-1.52) (1.77) (-1.85) (-0.75) (-0.01) (-0.50)
(RAR trigger) less than 1 s.d.  0.17 — — 0.15 — —
    (2.54) — — (3.58) — —
Off-balance-sheet assets/TRWA 2.22 -0.40 3.29 0.38 2.39 0.18
    (2.04) (-0.14) (2.73) (1.04) (2.06) (0.28)
Profit and loss/TRWA -2.73 -4.86 -3.99 -1.53 -8.63 0.10
    (-0.87) (-0.38) (-1.55) (-1.15) (-1.53) (0.08)
Total provisions -0.04 3.83 -2.71 -0.22 -1.85 0.85
    (-0.04) (1.49) (-2.68) (-0.53) (-1.14) (1.89)
100-percent-weighted assets/TRWA 0.16 -0.32 0.35 0.09 0.23 -0.09
    (1.44) (-1.25) (2.52) (1.86) (1.75) (-1.61)
Lagged dependent variable 0.52 -3.89 1.86 -3.09 -0.78 -2.82
   (1.13) (-1.83) (4.38) (-4.90) (-0.37) (-3.27)
Notes: TRWA and RAR denote total risk-weighted assets and risk/asset ratio. Data are for ninety-four banks from fourth-quarter 1989 to fourth-quarter 1995. Estimates 
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(which attract low-risk weights in bank capital calcula-
tions) for private sector loans (which attract high-risk
weights), or alternatively that they raise extra capital by
issuing securities or by retaining earnings.
The three right-hand-columns of Table 1 show
regressions of changes in 100-percent-weighted assets as
a ratio to total risk-weighted assets on the lagged level
of this ratio and on the same conditioning variables as
those included in the RAR regressions. Although the
parameters for the two regulatory intervention dummies
have the right signs, they are insignificant. The magni-
tudes of the point estimates are fairly small as well. In
general,  t-statistics are low, suggesting that the
100-percent-weighted asset ratio does not behave in a
statistically stable way over time and across banks. In
summary, it seems fair to conclude that banks do not
significantly rely on asset substitution away from
high-risk-weighted assets to meet their capital require-
ments as they approach the regulatory minimum.
Table 2 reports results for regressions similar to
our RAR regressions reported above but using different
capital ratios. Both the Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital ratio
regressions we perform indicate that banks raise their ratios
when they come close to their triggers. The response of
banks to increases in their triggers is much higher for
Tier 1 than for Tier 2 capital, suggesting that the bulk of
the adjustment comes through increases in narrow capital.
The adjustment in capital that occurs when banks are close
to their triggers is more evenly spread across the two cate-
gories of capital.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we summarise some of the results of Ediz,
Michael, and Perraudin (1998) on the impact of bank
capital requirements on the capital ratio choices of U.K.
banks. We use confidential supervisory data including
detailed information about the balance sheet and profit and
loss of all British banks over the period 1989-95.
The conclusions we reach are reassuring in that
capital requirements do seem to affect bank behaviour over
and above the influence of the banks’ own internally gener-
ated capital targets. Furthermore, banks appear to achieve
adjustments in their capital ratios primarily by directly
boosting their capital rather than through systematic
substitution away from assets such as corporate loans,
which attract high-risk weights in the calculation of Basle
Accord–style capital requirements.
In short, this interpretation of the U.K. evidence
makes capital requirements appear to be an attractive regu-
latory instrument since they serve to reinforce the stabil-
ity of the banking system without apparently distorting
banks’ lending choices.
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